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Modeling, Statistics and Political Circumstances
How the Concept of Economic Development Triumphed
and what this Means for Development Alternatives
Abstract
The notion of “economic development” dominates aid policy. A nation’s per capita
Gross Domestic Product (gdp) determines whether that country is considered
developed or less developed, and the standard measure of any developmental
progress is gdp growth. This article investigates the evolution of the concept of
economic development, as it emerged from a specific combination of modeling,
statistics and political circumstances. In this story, Arthur Lewis played a decisive
role, but only by building upon Colin Clark’s first global national income statistics,
an indispensible foundation for Lewis’s seminal model of economic development.
This model was embraced by policy makers longing for a theoretical framework to
clarify and operationalize the hitherto vague concept of development. More
importantly, however, the statistical indicator on which Lewis based his theory
had already been universally accepted. In other words: statistics came before theory.
This holds important lessons for alternative development ideas. It explains why the
idea of economic development remains so firmly entrenched and suggests the
conditions that might be necessary for an alternative theory to take hold.
Keywords: Economic Development; Statistics; Gross Domestic Product; Develop-
ment Alternatives; Economic Models.
A L T H O U G H T H E T E R M “ D E V E L O P M E N T ” potentially
encompasses a broad array of possibilities, development policy and
development aid are dominated by the narrow concept of economic
development. Economic development manifests itself through high
levels of per-capita income and a high Gross National or Gross
Domestic Product (gnp or gdp1). Its converse, economic
1 In international statistics in the 1990s,
Gross Domestic Product, gdp, (the monetary
value of all goods produced within a country)
replaced Gross National Product, gnp, (the
value of goods and services produced by the
citizens of a specific country—e.g. including
in American gnp also goods produced by
American companies in Germany) as the
standard measure of economic strength.
The methodological differences of the two
concepts are of minor importance here—both
give an aggregate monetary value to all goods
and services produced within a given
timeframe.
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underdevelopment, is linked to low incomes, a low national product
and negligible gnp (or gdp) growth. The underlying conviction is that
less developed countries can (and should) “catch up” to the economic
status and living standards of the industrialized world—chiefly by
industrializing themselves. In any case, economic development entails
an important sequence: it is the economy that is to grow first, thereby
enabling improvements in other aspects of social development and
general welfare to follow.
Although this notion of development is historically linked to the
early decades of development aid and modernization theory, it still
remains the ideal trajectory, aspired to throughout the globe today.
If countries such as India, China, and previously the “miracle”
Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.) have been
hailed for their successful development, it has been because of their
technological and industrial progress and high growth rates.2 Many
a modern development economist would hold that such structural
change is still the optimal way forward. The recommendations
made by Paul Collier to the countries of Africa in his “The Bottom
Billion” [2006] provide a good example of this view, as well as the
simple fact that the term “industrialized country” is generally used
as a synonym for “developed country”, implying that a sound
industrial structure is still the key prerequisite for lasting de-
velopment.3 Moreover, a country’s level of development remains
predominantly defined and codified in terms of gdp per capita: for
example, in the statistical annex of each year’s “World Develop-
ment Report” issued by the World Bank, it is gdp per capita that is
emphasized over all other possible development indicators.
Above all, economic development is a universally accepted concept,
a global synonym for progress. Not only less developed countries, but the
industrialized countries, as well, focus on gdp and gdp—growth and define
their levels of development and progress according to these figures.
The notion of economic development is thus a dominant concept,
and has been so for many decades. This article will detail how the idea
of economic development came to attain its current significance. It
will show that economic development triumphed the moment that
Arthur Lewis expressed the concept and theory of economic
development by means of a simple model.
2 World Bank 1993.
3 See also for instance the recommendation of
the “Commission on Growth of Development”
from 2008, or simply any textbook on economic




As John Maynard Keynes famously stated, “economic ideas” rule
the world and highly influence politicians [1936: 383]. Economic ideas
and theories, however, must be written in a specific language in order
to be acceptable to both economists and politicians. They must be
formulated as models in order to achieve even a modicum of success.
Arthur Lewis’s model of “economic development with unlimited
supplies of labor” can be regarded as a prime example. Yet Lewis
could not have come up with his idea of economic development had it
not been for the seminal empirical work of Colin Clark, the eccentric
founder of modern national income statistics, who is mostly forgotten
today.
From the 1930s onwards, Clark single-handedly and innovatively
compiled statistical data to describe the workings of the economy, first
on a national, but later also on an international level—at a time when
empirical economics or concise economic data did not exist and
neither governments nor economists saw any practical benefit in
gathering any. Clark not only proposed defining progress as the
growth of per capita income, he also gave the first numerical
expression of the degree of poverty in the colonies and identified the
structural changes—according to statistical data—that a country un-
derwent during the development process. Lewis took the empirical
insights provided by Clark and turned them into what was expected
from an economist: an abstract but easy-to-understand theoretical
model. It was through this methodological coup that Lewis and his
idea of economic development ultimately succeeded, making Lewis, in
the eyes of many, not only “the founder of economic development as
a serious sub-discipline of economics” [Tignor 2006: 266] but also
a change agent and norm entrepreneur [Finnemore and Sikkink 1998]
who—through his work as a consultant and expert—helped to
popularize his ideas within the newly created international aid
organizations and governments.
This triumph was helped by two facilitating circumstances. One
was that, although the term “economic development” had been
around for some time, and politicians around the globe were eager
to develop, there was still no clear and comprehensive understanding
of what development meant—both in terms of definition as well as in
terms of policy recommendations. The other was that the national
income statistics on which Lewis based his model of economic de-
velopment had already become part and parcel of the international
political culture, even if there was not yet a unifying theory behind them.
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This combination of modeling, statistics and political circumstance
is historically unique and holds important lessons for those attempting
to loosen the dominance of economic development and to replace it
with an alternative notion of development. It shows that providing
new paradigms of development might not suffice unless they are
backed by generally accepted numbers as well as by a receptive
political culture. Up until now, however, development alternatives
have been introduced “the other way around”—as I will make clear in
the final section of this paper. Nonetheless, recent international
attempts to define alternative welfare indicators may yet succeed in
paving the way for a lasting development counter-narrative.
In the pages to follow, I will first examine the usage of the
expression “economic development” before it acquired its modern
meaning. I will then describe the life and work of Colin Clark and his
inadvertent discovery of the notion of economic development through
his invention of modern national income analysis. Following this, I
will explain how Arthur Lewis made use of Clark’s statistics to
develop his theory of how a country should develop, and I will also
comment on the lasting legacy of his ideas. In the concluding section,
I will examine the implications of this historical episode for the
development of strategies to promote alternative concepts of
development.
Even though this article highlights a “key concept,” i.e. economic
development, I believe that to fully understand the emergence of such
a concept (and its alternatives, as will become clear in the later part of
the paper) it is important to examine the people behind those ideas, as
well as their motivations, thereby illustrating how specific ideas and
approaches were invented, reformulated or re-structured and what,
and who, eventually enabled them to triumph—and how.
On the term “economic development”
The expression “economic development” had been around for
quite some time before a widely accepted meaning was attached to it.
In the introduction to “Das Kapital,” Karl Marx famously wrote that
the “industrially more developed countries” showed the “less
developed” the mirror image of their future [Marx 1977: 12].
He spoke of “industrially,” not of “economically” developed
countries—but according to Marxian theory, it was the economy that
philipp lepenies
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shaped how societies functioned. His use of the term “developed” was
rather coincidental. Marx used the adjective to emphasize that an
automatic and linear universal historical evolution awaited all coun-
tries of the globe, in which industrialized bourgeois capitalism played
a decisive role.4
Half a century later, Joseph Schumpeter published a “Theory of
Economic Development” (Die Theorie der wirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, 1911). In Schumpeter’s understanding, economic
development was a synonym for technological progress. The in-
novative entrepreneur brought about technological change through
the “creative destruction” of old economic patterns. However, this
understanding of economic development had little to do with how the
term is understood today.
In Britain, economic development entered political rhetoric in the
late 19th century in connection with the administration of the British
colonies and overseas territories, especially Australia. In the usage of
British colonial administrators, economic development described the
exploitation of the natural “resources of the colony” [Arndt 1981:
461]. It meant the construction of infrastructure in order to facilitate
resource exploitation for the benefit of Britain, not necessarily for the
benefit of the territory in question.
British colonial administration differentiated between the eco-
nomic development of a country and the “social well-being”, that is
the living standards, of the inhabitants of the colony [Arndt 1981:
463]. Initially, these two concepts were unconnected.
This can be seen in the 1924 Charter of the League of Nations,
which is the first codification of the idea of development assistance in
international law. Article 22 stipulated that to the former colonies
“which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be
applied the principle that the well-being and development of such
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of
their resources, their experience or their geographical position can
best undertake this responsibility” [League of Nations 1924, Anghie
2002, Lepenies 2014b, my emphasis]. Another example of this co-
existence of concepts was the British principle of the Dual Mandate,
enshrined in the Colonial Development Act of 1929. It made clear that
Britain’s responsibility was to develop the economic potential of the
4 The original reads: “Das industriell
entwickeltere Land zeigt dem minder
entwickelten nur das Bild der eigenen
Zukunft.”
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colonies while at the same time caring for the welfare of its inhabitants
in terms of improved health, education and nutrition.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, but especially during
World War II, it became obvious that the world, and with it the
British Empire, was in the midst of a historical transformation whose
direction or outcome nobody could foresee. Yet, with unrest and the
quest for independence arising in the colonies, more efforts had to be
made to improve the often appalling situation of the peoples living
overseas. Specific funds were earmarked to improve the “develop-
ment” of the colonies (for instance under the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act—another expression of the parallel existence of the
two ideas5), and specific “development plans” and strategies had to be
drafted by the colonies themselves without a clear idea as to how
development and welfare could be linked.
In an article entitled “An Economic Plan for Jamaica” [Lewis
1944], Arthur Lewis criticized the fact that colonial administrators
typically called for the improvement of infrastructure or agricultural
research in their “development plans” while at the same time asking
for additional funds for the creation of schools and health facilities.
What was missing, from his point of view, was a strategy to indicate
how the economic development of the colony could be planned in such
a fashion as to lastingly finance and maintain institutions providing
welfare, i.e. how economic and social development could be combined
into a coherent framework.
Within the economics profession, the Austrian Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan (who had emigrated to Britain) had innovatively expressed the
notion of industrializing “economically backward areas” in two
seminal papers in 1943 and 1944. He held that “[m]any nations, many
peoples” had “become impatient” because of appalling living con-
ditions (Rosenstein-Rodan 1944: 158). This was not only a “moral,
but even more a political and economic problem.” Stable and
prosperous peace required “international action to improve the living
conditions of those peoples who missed the industrialization ‘bus’ in
the nineteenth century.” Rosenstein-Rodan called for a massive capital
transfer from the rich to the poor countries, giving rise to the idea
of aid. But his reasoning was less economic than political. For him,
“the development of the economically backward areas of the world”
was “the most important task facing us in the making of the peace”
[1944: 159].
5 The terms “welfare” and “well-being” were used synonymously.
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Thus, although ample use was made of the term “economic
development” towards the end of World War II, there was no
underlying theory of economic development behind it (Teitz and
Chappel 2013: 212). But what was obvious to many was that the “gap”
between rich and poor countries had to be closed for reasons of
international stability and peace.
In 1947, one of the first United Nations documents on develop-
ment was published: a report entitled “Economic Development in
Selected Countries: Plans, Programmes and Agencies.” It stated that
“the government’s ultimate aim in economic development is to raise
the national welfare of the entire population” (UN p. xv quoted in
Arndt 465). Here, suddenly, a direct link was claimed between
economic development and welfare enhancement—but again, this
was not based on any clear theory of economic development. The
report was a mere summary of investments made in the economic
infrastructure of sample countries.
In his 1949 inaugural address, the American president Harry S.
Truman emphasized, as had Rosenstein-Rodan, the importance of
economic and industrial advancement for peace and prosperity. Tru-
man’s speech is usually seen as the starting point of the era of
development aid, as he proclaimed: “We must embark on a bold
new program [.] for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped
areas.” An effort should be made “for the achievement of peace,
plenty, and freedom.” Through the “increase in industrial activity”
countries were to raise their standard of living. According to Truman,
the key to prosperity and peace lay in “greater production” (Truman
1949). This “politics of productivity,” as it was later called, was the
political conviction of the time, based on the positive experience of the
Marshall Plan. It was an important part of the Truman doctrine at the
beginning of the Cold War. Once a country had industrialized,
prosperity and living standards would improve and capitalism would
prevail over communism.6
Yet this was essentially a political credo, and the word “develop-
ment” had not yet become automatically attached to it. It would take
several more years for a theory of development to be codified by the
recently emerged discipline of development economics and taken up
by international organizations such as the World Bank or other UN
agencies. But the idea that the poor countries were somehow to
“develop” economically was in the air, and a search among academics
6 See Kuznets [1968].
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for a concise theory of development began. Arthur Lewis was one of
the pioneers. He started lecturing on “economic development” at the
University of Manchester in 1950 [Meier 2001: 40].
It was Lewis’s paper “Economic Development with Unlimited
Supplies of Labour” from 1954, as well as his subsequent book on
“The Theory of Economic Growth” from 1955, that constituted the
founding documents of the modern concept of economic develop-
ment. In them, Lewis argued that the main strategy for economic
development was industrialization—and that economic growth
allowed for the solution of diverse political and social problems
[Lewis 1954, 1955]. With Lewis’s model, development and de-
velopment policy received a theoretical foundation. But why was
Arthur Lewis able to formulate his ideas in a way that others before
him had failed to achieve? The reason is that he made innovative
use of the work of Colin Clark and his novel idea of producing and
interpreting national income statistics. And by doing so, he gained
the credibility and recognition that Colin Clark was unable to
achieve for himself.
The statistical discovery of economic progress: Colin Clark
Before the 1930s, concise economic statistical data were rarely
available. Little use was made by policy makers of coherent statistical
information on the economy, nor were economic data regularly
compiled by government request. The extent to which economic data
were unavailable in the wake of the Great Depression seems incredible
from today’s point of view. In one of his first publications, Clark
lamented “the disgraceful condition of British official statistics”
[Clark, 1932: vi]. Historically, there had been various attempts in
different countries at calculating national income and other aspects of
national wealth or income distribution. But until then, politicians had
not been convinced that the often very vague data could be put to
practical political use. Moreover, economic science at that time was
predominantly based on theorizing, less so on empirical analysis. This
changed with the Great Depression.
During the crisis of 1929, Colin Clark, a young chemist at Oxford,
developed an interest in understanding what was happening to the
national and international economy. However, listening to economists
at his college and elsewhere discussing the dramatic situation, the
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natural scientist Clark was appalled to find that economists could excel
in finding theoretical arguments for the crisis and for their solutions,
but that their ideas were never based on empirical data. He wrote:
“Not one in a hundred [economists] [.] seems to understand what
constitutes the scientific approach, namely the careful systematization
of all observed facts, the framing of hypotheses from these facts,
prediction of fresh conclusions on the basis of these hypotheses, and
the testing of these conclusions against further observed facts. It
would be laughable, were it not tragic, to watch the stream of books
and articles attempting to solve exceptionally complex problems of
present-day economics by theoretical arguments, often without even
a single reference to the observed facts of the situation” [Clark 1940:
vii-viii]. For Clark, “economics should be of practical benefit to the
human race” and this could only be done “with a respect for observed
facts in preference to long chains of theoretical reasoning” (1940: ix).
He was decidedly un-theoretical. His idea was not to produce yet
another contribution to economic theory, but to limit himself to
empirical measurement and estimation.7 Statistical data should speak
for itself. He held that there was “room for two or three economic
theorists in each generation not more [.] The rest of us should be
economic scientists, content steadily to lay stone on stone in building
the structure of ordered knowledge” [1940: x].
Clark admired William Petty, whose “Political Arithmetick” in the
17th century was a first (albeit unsuccessful) attempt to apply the then-
novel Baconian ideas of measurement and data collection to the realm
of politics and who believed that sound policies should be based on
statistical information.8 Clark went on to collect data on the economy
by himself, without external funding or research assistance.
This herculean task is almost unimaginable. Clark started by
analyzing former attempts at calculating national income, found fault
with the prevalent methodologies and went on to invent many of the
modern concepts and tools of national income accounting after
painstakingly collecting raw data from a myriad of different institu-
tional sources (industry associations, workers’ unions and syndicates,
7 The following quote by Francis Bacon
served as a motto for Clark’s “Conditions of
Economic Progress”: “It cannot be that ax-
ioms established by argumentation can suf-
fice for the discovery of new works, for the
subtilty of Nature exceedeth many times over
the subtilty of argument.”
8 Petty was also explicitly anti-theoretical.
He had written: “The Method I take, is not
yet very usual; for instead of using only
comparative and superlative Words, and in-
tellectual Arguments, I have taken the course
(as a Specimen of the Political Arithmetick I
have longed aimed at) to express my self in
terms of Number, Weight, or Measure; to use
only Arguments of Sense, and to consider
only such Causes, as have visible Founda-
tions in Nature” [Hull 1899: lxv].
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etc.) in the absence of a functioning national statistics office. In 1932,
he was able to condense his empirical findings in a book entitled
“National Income 1924-1931” [Clark 1932]. It was the most empir-
ically-based and methodologically sound presentation of British
economic statistics thus far. A more data-grounded publication had
never been published in economics. The book consisted almost
exclusively of numbers, tables and methodological definitions. In it,
Clark defined National Income as the sum total of all goods and
services produced in one year valued at market prices. As this figure
did not account for depreciation, it was a “gross” measure, making
Clark the inventor of what was later to be called “Gross National
Product” [1932: 118]—a term that Clark himself never used.
Although his book astonished economists and subsequently gained
him a post as lecturer in statistics in Cambridge, politicians were little
impressed or influenced by his work, nor did economists readily make
use of his numbers. In Keynes’s “General Theory” of 1936, for
instance, Colin Clark and his work are mentioned only once.9
Yet Colin Clark, a maverick, had found a calling and continued his
quest for data. In his second publication, “National Income and
Outlay” from 1937, Clark reconstructed the evolution of national
income and its components from the 19th century onwards. Innova-
tively, he proposed to use “the rate of growth of real income per head”
[Clark 1937: 264] and called this the measure of economic progress.
This measure proved incredibly useful. Not only could Clark show
how much income had risen over time, but it was also possible for him
to identify phases of economic decline in which incomes had stagnated
or fallen. In this way, he was able to quantify exactly how severe
economic depressions had been in the past. For him, national income
(and with it income per capita) was the only reliable measure for
quantifying progress.
Even with Clark’s second publication and the methodological
toolkit he provided, both the academic and political world remained
unimpressed. With no future prospects in academia, Clark left Cam-
bridge and emigrated to Australia, where he became director of the
Queensland Bureau of Industry as well as a government statistician.
In Australia, Clark finished his most important publication, the
9 During World War II, however, Keynes
suddenly recognized the potential of na-
tional income accounting to visualize the
workings of the economy according to his
macroeconomic theory. Making amend-
ments to Clark’s original methodology
(and later also to the methodology proposed
by Simon Kuznets in the US), it was
Keynes who was able to catapult National
Income and Gross Domestic Product sta-




“Conditions of Economic Progress” [1940]. Therein, Clark took his
statistical analysis to a new level: the international comparison of
national income and income per capita data.
But Clark’s analysis was not merely a compilation of international
figures. In his own words, he set out to “give us as much information
as possible on the matter which after all concerns us most—namely, to
find the conditions under which we can hope for the greatest degree of
economic progress in the future” [1940: vii]. In other words, what
Clark sought to discover was whether his numbers gave hints as to
how the process of development (or economic progress as he named it)
functioned.
In a single table, Clark summarized his estimates of the income
of various parts of the world. This was the first time that this global
overview of the different levels in income had been calculated and
visualized. The numbers revealed that the world was “a wretchedly
poor place” [1940: 2], with 81% of the world’s population subsisting
on an income of less than 10 US dollars per week. Two-thirds of the
world’s output was produced in the so-called industrial countries,
with less than one-third of the world’s population. Half of the
world’s output was produced by only four countries (US, GB,
France, Germany). With these “hard facts,” Clark could lament
that ”the age of plenty” would “still be a long while in coming”
[1940: 4].
Yet he also analyzed what made the rich or more developed
countries so different from the rest. Clark proposed to differentiate
among three distinct sectors. The primary (agriculture, fishing,
forestry), the secondary (manufacturing, mining and building) and
the tertiary sector (commerce, transport, services, etc.). His statistical
comparison revealed that a high level of income per head was “always”
associated with a “high proportion of the working population engaged
in tertiary industries.” For him, this was “a very firmly established
generalization” [1940: 6-7]. Whereas low real income per head was
“associated with [.] a high percentage in primary production” [1940:
7]. Over time, he found “the proportion of the working population
engaged in primary industry declining and in tertiary industry
increasing”. The proportion of the working population engaged in
“secondary industry” appeared “in every country to rise to a maximum
and then to begin falling, apparently indicating that each country
reaches a stage of maximum industrialization beyond which industry
begins to decline relative to tertiary production” [1940: 7]. Put more
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simply, it was industrialization that put countries on the path to
economic progress.
In chapter 10, entitled “The Morphology of Economic Growth”,
Clark dwelt on the issue further. Not only was the process of structural
transformation from the primary to the tertiary sector described as
a historical and general process, Clark also used the relatively un-
known term “economic growth” as a synonym for “economic prog-
ress” or development:
From Sir William Petty’s day to present time the transfer of working
population from primary production to secondary and tertiary has been
continuing, and perhaps will continue for as many centuries more. This is
clear evidence that world economic equilibrium has not yet been obtained,
and indeed that the world is still within a very long distance of obtaining it.
In other words, certain agricultural countries and regions must be regarded
as ‘overpopulated.’ This word is not used in the sense that they are in any
way unable to support their present populations, but simply in the
economic sense of the term, namely that their inhabitants could earn
considerably higher average real incomes per head in other industries or
territories, and, if actuated by economic motives, will in the course of time
do so [1940: 341].
But despite his important insights, Clark’s work again failed to
receive the attention it deserved. As Angus Maddison writes:
“Colin Clark was a loner, bubbling with ideas and handling a vast amount of
material . He presented the reader with a mass of primary material whose
analytic relevance was frequently difficult to perceive. He had hundreds of
tables, but in the first two editions, none of them were numbered, many had no
title and countries were not listed in alphabetical order [.] His bibliographical
references were frequently inadequate often omitting dates or titles [.] The
disorderly presentation of his magnum opus and the difficulty in digesting it is
a major reason why his distinguished role in the history of macromeasurement is
sometimes underestimated [.] If he had concentrated his efforts and been less
impatient to cover so many problems his impact would probably been greater”
[Maddison 2004: 27].
Nonetheless, the international figures gathered by Clark were the
standard data set until the late 1950s, when international income data
became more readily available. Not only did the numbers serve to
justify the apparent need for aid payments but, most importantly,
Clark’s structural interpretations of the process of development soon
found their way into development economics. Colin Clark was the first
development economist, without being conscious of it. Nonetheless, it
was not Colin Clark who established himself as the development
economist of the first hour, but Arthur Lewis.
In parallel with Clark’s work in Britain, the Soviet emigre Simon
Kuznets had been working on national income tables in the United
philipp lepenies
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States at the request of Congress from the early 1930s onwards,
although his first statistical publication appeared two years after
Clark’s initial calculations of national income. And although he is
generally regarded as one of the major pioneers of national income
accounting (and sometimes even more remembered for that than
Clark), Kuznets argued that national income data was only of limited
use. For instance, he vehemently opposed the idea that different
countries could be compared using the same national income account-
ing methodology (as Clark had done and as has since been done).
Given that economic and social structures differed from one country
to another (for instance by the degree of work done by the household),
Kuznets felt that national income methodology should be calibrated
differently for each country. This would come at the price of in-
ternational incomparability, but the numbers generated would better
encapsulate the real economic potential of the individual country
(Kuznets 1933, 1934; see also Fioramonti 2013). As a consequence,
Kuznets did not produce any international comparisons or infer
supposedly universal workings of international development from
international data sets. For this reason, his influence on the emergence
of the theory of economic development (understood as economic
growth) was very limited at best. However, his later writings on
inequality and on the determinants of growth were to have a large
impact on development theory—but only once the idea of economic
development had already been established, thanks in large measure to
Clark—and to Arthur Lewis [Kuznets 1955; 1968; Lepenies 2013].10
What did happen in the aftermath of Clark’s publications, however,
was that during the late phases of World War II, and unintendedly,
national income statistics became a useful and powerful planning tool
for wartime production purposes in the United States, though now
referred to under the new name Gross National Product (gnp). gnp
resulted from an adaptation of Clark’s methodology but placed
a stronger focus on industrial production than on income (whereas
Kuznets’s methodological ideas on national income were now mostly
ignored). The statistical figure gnp was strongly propagated by the
government bodies responsible for military planning. In the United
States, positive gnp growth became a shorthand indicator for
10 The subject matter of this paper is the
initial emergence of the idea of economic
growth through the fortuitous combination
of the efforts of Clark and Lewis. The large
variety of theories on growth that character-
ized economics from the mid-1950s onwards
(not only through Solow and Growth Theory
in general, but also through the Neo-Marxist
and Socialist Growth Theorists like Baran,
Lange and Kalecki) is not dealt with here, as
these authors did not play a decisive role as
initiators of the concept.
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industrial and military might and gnp data figured prominently in the
media and within political rhetoric (e.g. in Roosevelt’s speeches). And
although World War II has been dubbed a “gnp war” [Weigley 1973],
gnp’s political usefulness outlasted the fighting, retaining its promi-
nence in the years to follow [Lepenies 2013].
The growth of gnp indicated that the economy was expanding, thus
enabling more people to be employed. At a time when millions of
servicemen were returning home, growth became a national necessity
to avoid unemployment in peacetime. At the same time, as the Soviet
Union achieved atomic power status, with its true economic potential
unknown, a rising gnp was viewed as necessary in order to survive and
ultimately triumph in the Cold War. As part of the Truman doctrine,
as mentioned earlier, gnp growth was also seen as the most important
political goal in preventing other countries from falling into the hands
of communists. With the Marshall Plan, the United States compelled
recipient countries to begin calculating national gnp figures in order to
ensure the international comparability of their economic strength—
rendering gnp statistics the universal methodology of international
comparison. When the first post-war years produced an increase in
material living standards of unprecedented historical proportions,
seemingly making everybody better off, gnp finally became a general
indicator of welfare. All this happened within a short span of time (less
than 15 years).11 By the early 1950s, gnp and gnp growth, and thus
industrial expansion, had become a political fetish, a measure of
identity. High gnp and growth figures were seen as traits of in-
dustrialized nations—and thus of high development—in the absence
of a clear theory of development.
The theory of economic development: Arthur Lewis
In 1979, Sir Arthur Lewis was awarded the recently established
Nobel Prize in Economics for his contribution to the field of de-
velopment theory. In development economics, there is probably no
other figure as prominent as Lewis. Born on the island of St. Lucia in
the West Indies in 1915, Lewis experienced firsthand the effect of
widespread poverty, illiteracy and violence that made itself felt there.
His interest in all questions of social and economic improvement of
11 For a detailed political history of national accounts, gnp and Gross Domestic Product
(gdp) see Lepenies 2013.
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the colonies stemmed in great measure from his own experiences of
the dire situation in the British Caribbean. A gifted student, Lewis
won a scholarship to study at the London School of Economics. One
of his most influential teachers was Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who at
the time began to develop his research interest in the question of
reconstruction and economic inequality among nations. Even before
completing his PhD thesis, Lewis was employed as a faculty lecturer.
Given the international background of many students at lse, he
became interested in integrating the analysis of the economic situation
of specific countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America into his
courses. From this interest, Lewis developed a special course in
“colonial economics”, which was offered in 1943-1944 and was the
first course of this type at the university [Tignor 2006: 20-22].12
One of the topics that arose concerning the progress of the colonies
was the issue of planning. Lewis’s publication “The Principles of
Economic Planning” from 1949 established him as a leading authority
on questions regarding colonial administration and provided him
regular employment as an advisor to the Colonial Office (Eckert
2009), especially since the book contained a short appendix entitled
“On Planning in Backward Countries”.13
In 1947, Lewis was appointed to the chair in economics at the
University of Manchester. A few years later, in 1951, he was asked by
the Secretary General of the newly created United Nations to be part
of a team of experts investigating “Measures for the Economic
Development of Under-Developed Countries” [UN 1951]. As the
first major document of the UN to highlight the question of
development including policy recommendations, the findings of the
report mostly represented Arthur Lewis’s personal theoretical
deliberations, which he was to formulate more succinctly in his
article on the “unlimited supply of labor.” In the report, the notion
of underdevelopment was defined as the situation where “per capita
real income is low when compared to the per capita real income of
the United States of America, Canada, Australia and Western
Europe” [UN 1951: 3]. Furthermore, development was all about
combating unemployment and under-employment in the underde-
veloped world. The road to development, in the understanding of the
report, was via economic growth, in order to make use of what was
12 Findlay (1989) provides a comprehen-
sive biographical sketch. The major point of
reference, however, is the seminal biography
by Tignor [2006].
13 On the importance of planning in the
discourse on economic development, see
Lepenies 2014a.
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considered to be the unproductive excess labor force of the agrarian
sector:
In many underdeveloped areas, the population on the land is so great that large
numbers could be withdrawn from agriculture without any fall in agricultural
output. If this labor were employed on public works, capital would be created
without any fall in the other output, or in total consumption [UN 1951, 41].14
The focus on the labor supply of the agrarian sector was highly
innovative and allowed “underdeveloped” countries to be perceived
as structurally different from the industrialized world. This issue lies
at the heart of Lewis’s article “Economic Development with Un-
limited Supplies of Labour”, that was published in 1954. According
to Paul Krugman the paper is “the most famous paper in all
development economics” [Krugman 1997: 18]. In fact, it provided
the first clear-cut theory of economic development. It was not merely
that it contained ideas and strategies for policymakers as to what
should be done concretely in order to promote development—
since this is what other authors of his generation (such as Albert
Hirschman, Gunnar Myrdal, Ragnar Nurkse and others) had also
provided. Instead, Lewis created and explained the economic model
of a “dualistic economy,” i.e. an economy that consisted of a tradi-
tional sector, mostly subsistence agriculture, with low productivity
and a large number of underemployed laborers (“surplus labor” in
the words of Lewis, who assumed a marginal productivity of zero for
this group) and, at the same time, a modern capitalist and industrial
sector. Departing from this observation, Lewis constructed the
paradigm of the “expanding capitalist nucleus” [Hunt 1989: 86].
This described the idea that the capitalist sector should be developed
in such a fashion as to make optimal use of the “unlimited supplies of
labor”, so that the underemployed and idle work force of agriculture
could be transferred to the industrial sector. Development, so the
model suggested, was then all about concentrating on the growth of
the industrial sector—triggered by the belief in the ready availability
of potential workers. Once the workforce of the “traditional” sector
was fully absorbed, the capitalist sector would have grown large
enough to be self-sustaining [Preston 1996: 165]. Thus, the process
of development would lead to a gradual restructuring of the
economy. The relative weight of the industrial (and later the service)
sector would rise throughout the process of development, as the
importance of the agricultural sector declined.
14 Also quoted in Meier and Seers, 13.
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This message not only provided the economic model for the
nascent theory of modernization, it also claimed that the problems
of underdevelopment were mostly a question of the internal restruc-
turing of a country. In order to “push” the growth of the industrial
sector, foreign capital might be needed, but the obstacles to de-
velopment were mostly endogenous.15 The 1951 UN report stated
that “all countries” were “in a position where their national incomes
could be greatly increased by better utilization of what they have”
[UN 1951: 4].
Lewis’s model was optimistic, and this certainly added to its
attraction for politicians and development policy makers. It “sug-
gested that a seeming disadvantage of less developed societies—the
presence of large numbers of unskilled workers in the agricultural
sector—could become an advantage if this very same unskilled, largely
redundant agrarian workforce were put to work in an expanding
industrial sector”[Tignor 2006: 273].
Development—economic development—was all about growth:
growth in terms of Gross National Product and per capita income,
which would mirror the rise in industrial production, the growth of the
modern capitalist and industrial sector. With this focus on growth, the
erstwhile dilemma of how to combine the idea of economic develop-
ment with the general welfare of the population seemed to be resolved:
“The horse of development should go in front carrying the cart of
welfare behind it” as Lewis put it (quoted in Tignor, 2006: 73).
In 1955, Lewis published “The Theory of Economic Growth,” the
first major economic publication on growth to further develop the
issues of the earlier paper. Right at the beginning, Lewis asserted that
growth was “the appropriate framework for studying economics”
[Lewis 1955: 5]. Moreover, growth was used as a synonym for
“progress” as well as “development” (Lewis 1955: 10; see also Arndt
1978). Lewis’s ideas on growth were a “full blueprint of the diverse
prerequisites for increasing per-capita output” which included
“societal-wide transformations in cultural values, family organization
and commitment to a work ethos as well as the standard economic
prerequisites of [.] investment and precise government planning”
[Tignor 2006: 273].
While at the lse, Lewis, like other British economists working on
international issues, became acquainted with Colin Clark’s work.
Many early papers on developmental issues made reference to
15 This was in sharp contrast to the posi-
tions elaborated by Raul Prebisch and his
collaborators at cepal, the UN agency for
Latin America.
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Clark’s 1940 figures. Lewis, in his 1954 article, speaks in passing of
the “path-breaking and praiseworthy” work done by Clark [Lewis
1954: 159] but otherwise makes little mention of him in his writings.
Yet not only did Lewis readily use the statistical indicators suggested
by Clark in order to define progress and development, but his 1954
paper is nothing less than a simple translation of Clark’s statistics
into an economic model, especially the idea of the quasi unlimited
supply of labor and the possibility of integrating this labor force in
the expanding industrial nucleus. This is not to belittle the work of
Lewis or to accuse him of plagiarism. Instead, it shows that, in order
to succeed, the idea of economic development had to be transformed
into the language spoken by economists: a theory substantiated by
a model. And in the case of Lewis, this model built on the one
statistical indicator (gnp growth) which had already revolutionized
Western politics.
Lewis’s legacy
The 1954 paper caused an “overnight sensation.” It was not only
“short, well written, easy to understand, original and self-evident, at
least to nonspecialists” [Tignor 2006: 82]. It also, “galvanized the new
field of development economics, providing it with a legitimacy that it
had not previously enjoyed.” As a result, Lewis, “if not towering
above the others” (meaning the other pioneers in development
economics), was certainly “primus inter pares” [Tignor 2006: 79].
But it was not only development practitioners and administrators
who were attracted to Lewis’s arguments, but economists them-
selves.16 In a famous article on the legacy of development economics,
Paul Krugman dwelt on the issue of why certain economic ideas come
to be accepted while others do not. He wrote: “To be taken seriously
an idea has to be something you can model” [Krugman 1997: 18]. And
this is exactly what Lewis’s concept of dualism and unlimited supplies
of labor provided.
Reflecting on development economists and their work, Krugman
asked “why was Lewis influential?” And he provided the answer himself:
“The key reason [.] was that the surplus labor story, unlike many other
16 Needless to say, in most development
agencies, especially in the early decades, the
great majority of employees were economists.
In the World Bank, the ratio of economists to
non-economists was 50:1 until well into the
1990s [Chambers 1996: 50].
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development stories emerging at the time, could be formalized relatively
easily so it gave economists a way to follow the mainstream’s increasing
emphasis on rigor and formalization while continuing to do develop-
ment” [1997: 18]. Albert Hirschman, himself a pioneer of development
(albeit one famously satisfied for not having provided a concise theory)
similarly wrote that Lewis’s ideas helped “enhance the scientific aura and
status of the new field” [Hirschman, 1981: 10].17
According to Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers, “development
economics did not arise as a formal theoretical discipline, but was
fashioned as a practical subject in response to the needs of policy-
makers to advise governments on what could and should be done to
allow their countries to emerge from chronic poverty” [Meier and
Seers 1984: 4]. Many of the contributors to economic development
had been consultants themselves. Their ideas of “big pushes”, “great
spurts”, “balanced” or “unbalanced growth” might have been prac-
tical or comprehensive but, in any case, they lacked the rigor and
simplicity of Lewis’s model.
The prize committee of the Swedish Riksbanken (which sponsors
the Nobel prize in economics) shared this view. In its internet
factsheet, it not only highlights the fact that Lewis received the prize
for his pioneering research into development, but that his specific
contribution was the development of a model.18
Modeling is not only a specific way of “thinking like an econo-
mist”[Mankiw and Taylor 2011], it is also a particular form of
communication. Models are a means of persuasion, a means of
rhetoric, as Deirdre McCloskey has described [1983; 1990]. And it
is not only fellow economists who want to be persuaded, but
politicians as well. Models, as Mary Morgan has succinctly put it,
are often explicitly designed to provide “recipes to remake the world”
[2012: 404] and this is exactly what Lewis provided.
After World War II and in the endeavor to prevent another Great
Depression, politicians around the world began to seek the advice of
economists. The figure of the economic expert became an institution-
alized feature of politics, whether in the form of the council of
economic advisors in the US or as the proponent of development
aid. More than other social scientists, economists were able to make
themselves heard in politics—and the way they intended to make
themselves heard was by using models.
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Moreover, Lewis’s model fell on fertile ground. Clark’s ideas on
how to measure and define economic progress and growth had been
adapted and accepted by most governments (thus providing the
theoretical backing of a felt reality). Politicians no longer needed to
be convinced that development was an important issue. What had
been lacking, however, was a simple narrative that could, with all
academic rigor, not only explain the structural features of both
developed (high-income and industrialized) and underdeveloped
(low growth and low per capita income) countries, but also show
what had to be done in order to get a less developed country on track.
And best of all, the model which provided this also implied that
something could be done, that underdevelopment was not an eternal
fate, or the inevitable consequence of external circumstances. De-
velopment was an emulation of the path already taken by the
industrialized world, a process of convergence.
Although Lewis’s ideas and theory were harshly criticized by some
(especially his idea of a “labor surplus,”, see Schultz 1964 and Ranis
2004 for an overview of criticisms) his model was highly influential,
especially as Lewis himself was a ceaseless consultant to governments
and development institutions of the United Nations alike during the
1950s and 1960s. Walt Rostow’s “The Stages of Economic Growth”
from 1960 (whose main hypothesis had already been formulated in
1956) is an elaboration of Lewis’s ideas (as were most ideas of
modernization from political science) and reveals how his theory of
economic development left the confines of economics proper and
found its way into the wider political realm.
In its global outreach, Lewis’s idea of economic development
appeared as a modern interpretation of the traditional theories of
civilization and progress of Western modernity. The concept of
economic development upheld the ideas of the universality and
unilinearity of time as well as the notion that the observable socio-
economic, cultural and political differences among countries meant that
some countries or societies had already progressed further while others
were “backward” or “traditional” and had to “catch up” and “become
modern.” Additionally, the “further advanced” had the expertise and
knowledge to “assist” the others in accelerating their process of
convergence—just as in the philosophy of progress expressed for the
first time by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1793 [Lepenies 2014b].
But now it was no longer the use of reason that separated countries
and that should be fostered, but economic productivity and industri-
alization. Advanced countries could instruct and teach the
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“underdeveloped” or “less developed” exactly what had to be done in
order to enhance gnp and growth. From this, however, many other
non-economic side-effects would follow: a full-grown process of
modernization, westernization and international convergence—all as
by-products of economic growth. gnp and the notion of growth
reanimated the old ideas of “civilizing” the “less civilized,” not only
by replacing the term civilization with “development”, but also by
basing the notion of “development” no longer on some lofty concept
of “progress” or “culture” but on the supposedly unequivocal hard
numbers of economic reality [Lepenies 2008].
After Lewis: establishing alternatives
to economic development “the other way around”
Lewis’s ideas were not original in themselves. In their essence, they
did not provide a novel view of the development process. But Lewis took
existing threads and combined them in an original and lasting manner. As
well as attempting to “sell” a new view on development, he could build on
a general notion of what development was (or could be)—incorporating
an accepted statistical indicator. These facts might seem banal. But they
are not, especially not in light of the history of development alternatives.
Attempts to “dethrone” the idea of economic development have
often tried to establish development alternatives “the other way
around.” What I mean by this expression is that these counter-
concepts depart from an a priori normative and often theory-inspired
notion of what development should mean—and subsequently attempt
to translate these theories into statistical indicators. Ideally, these
indicators would not only be as powerful as gdp, but also surpass it. In
the case of alternative concepts of development, theory came before
statistics. This is true for the two most prominent attempts that
explicitly wished to replace the concept of economic development,
Basic Needs and Human Development.
In a famous paper from 1969, regarded as one of the founding
documents of the Basic Needs paradigm, Dudley Seers discussed the
“Meaning of Development.” Seers criticized the way in which an
increase in National Income (i.e. gnp) had become not only the prime
center of political attention in the West, but also the dominant
shorthand definition for “development.” The focus on industrialization
and economic growth had, in his view, sidelined the topics of hunger,
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unemployment, inequality and poverty, which according to Seers were
probably the most pressing issues in less developed societies (Seers
1969). He argued that development meant above all poverty alleviation
– instead of economic growth. Consequently new measures had to be
found to give a “true” picture and definition of development (“the
challenges for the remainder of this century [.] [are] [.] how to find
measures of development to replace national income”, Seers 2).
Out of this viewpoint grew the movement (led, amongst others by
the Dag Hammerskj€old Foundation, the ilo and the Institute for
Development Studies in Brighton) that attempted to replace gnp by
focusing instead on what were called the “Basic Needs” of societies—
which were to be measured by a series of social statistical indicators.
The theoretical groundwork of the Basic Needs approach was
Abraham Maslow’s concept of a “hierarchy of human needs” that he
had expressed in the early 1940s [Maslow 1943]. Various international
fora and meetings were instrumental in calling for a renewed and
poverty-centered view of development—highlighting the need for
meeting minimum requirements for food, shelter and clothing, for
providing access to safe drinking water, sanitation, health, transport
and education, and for ensuring decent work and working conditions.
The case for meeting Basic Needs, however, was “primarily
a moral/ideological” one [Hunt 1989: 266] and grew out of the
observation that although development had always attempted to
combat poverty, poverty itself and the living conditions of the poorest
had not been at the center of attention due to the focus on growth and
industrialization. Yet it was precisely the issue of what was to be
measured and thus what was to be counted as “Basic Needs” that
divided the international development community. Proposed meas-
ures were either not available for many countries, not credible, or
regarded as politically unacceptable by large international organiza-
tions (e.g. measures of inequality, distribution or political participa-
tion). Also, with many indicators it was unclear, not to say a muddle,
whether they were to be counted as an output, i.e. a result of
development, or a necessary input to other developmental basic needs
(e.g. health and education as inputs for employment and wealth).
Some Basic Needs proponents argued that the meeting of basic
needs should come before or instead of growth. However, critics held
that the focus on growth and economic development had to be
maintained at all costs in order to provide the necessary local means
to finance the provision of basic needs. As many social indicators of
Basic Needs showed a positive statistical correlation with gdp, this was
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taken as proof of the need to continue to focus on economic de-
velopment first [Streeten 1979].
The Basic Needs approach was not able to replace the dominant
position of economic development. What it did influence, however,
was the nature of aid practice. Next to industrialization schemes (the
traditional old-style development policy since the 1950s), develop-
ment aid was now also about building health clinics, schools, wells, etc.
in order to target poverty directly [Preston 1996]. And social
indicators (longevity, child mortality, literacy etc.) did find a lasting
place in discussions on development, but mainly as a complement to
the overall still-dominant figure of gdp—a far cry from challenging
the dominant position of gdp or the idea of economic growth.
Twenty years after Seers’s paper, another major attempt was made
to expand the notion of economic development. This time, the
theoretical foundation was the so-called “Capability Approach” that
had been developed by the economist Amartya Sen [1999]. Sen had
argued that growth was undoubtedly important, but merely a means
to a higher end. However, economic growth had become an end in
itself and little attention was paid to whether growth led to overall
development. For Sen, development was defined as the freedom to
live the life one had reason to value living. In other words, de-
velopment meant the possibility to flourish: politically, socially but
also economically. Income per capita might be an important input, but
so were health, education and political participation. Every time an
individual was prevented from living the life he or she wanted to live
(for instance, through constraints on female participation in the labor
market or in education that could prevent girls from taking up the
occupation they desired), this was a sign of poverty and underdevelop-
ment. Conversely, every time the possible alternatives for individuals
expanded, because obstacles such as the one mentioned above were
removed, this was a sign of development (see Kremakova 2013).
The harsh critique of the dominant role played by gdp and of the
concept of economic development itself (a direct critique of World
Bank policies) was one of the reasons why the economist Mahbub
Ul-Haq, director of the then little-known United Nations Develop-
ment Program (undp), decided to seize the opportunity to place his
agency at the forefront of the development debate—by attempting to
translate Amartya Sen’s ideas into measurable indicators in order to
replace gdp figures. With the collaboration of Sen, the Human De-
velopment Index (hdi) was created by undp staff, a composite indicator
combining statistical information on economic growth, education and
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longevity into a single number [Ul-Haq 1995: 61].19 Using the hdi,
countries were ranked according to their numerical index value. This
international ranking was published annually in the undp flagship
publication, the “Human Development Report,” beginning in 1990
[undp 1990]. In these reports, the undp deliberately contrasted the
ranking of countries according to the dogma of economic development
(i.e. gdp, as was done in the World Bank publications) with an
international ranking following the data on human development—to
make the point that the world is perceived differently according to
which measure is taken and that, needless to say, human development
provides a fuller picture of development than gdp.
However, although the hdi is highly visible in the media, the index
has always been strongly criticized as being more a publicity tool than
a credible statistic on development. Its methodological shortcomings
have been the subject of academic debate ever since the index was
introduced [Srinivasan 1994; Stanton 2007].20 Given that the index
was directly linked to a specific UN agency that openly attacked the
ruling dogma of the most powerful development institution, the
World Bank, it comes as no surprise that this effort to champion
human development was unable to effect a true paradigm change in
development—at least not one that would have challenged economic
development other than theoretically, especially as the attempt to
operationalize Human Development boils down to little more than the
traditional approach of meeting Basic Needs.21
Conclusion: alternative welfare measures new numbers
for a new development?
Given the perseverance of gdp and the concept of economic
development, it seems that rather than attempt to produce yet another
alternative “the other way around” (i.e. placing theory before statis-
tics), important lessons can be learned from the evolution of the idea
of economic development. For the success of an alternative concept of
19 The methodology of the index mirrored
an earlier attempt of measurement that was
presented as part of the Basic Needs debate,
i.e. the Physical Quality of Life Index pqli—
which had little palpable influence on devel-
opment policies or international discussions.
20 Castles holds that the HDI’s “position
[.] owes little to its intrinsic qualities and
much to the packaging and promotional
efforts of its multinational sponsor” (Castles
1998: 832, quoted in Stanton 2007).
21 Martha Nussbaum’s attempt at identi-
fying a set of “basic capabilities,” thus seems
little more than what had already become the




development, the first determining factor should be a manifest and
broad political will to consider alternative visions of development.
Secondly, one requires accepted statistical indicators of alternative
development approaches that have proven their political usefulness
and lastly, the development of a theory-based model that incorporates
these indicators and serves policy-makers as a guideline and justifi-
cation for their actions.
This is not a utopian vision. Various national and international
political initiatives have sprung up in recent years under the general
heading of “alternative welfare measurement.” These initiatives
comprise two elements: finding out what matters to people and
attempting to measure this statistically. But what stands behind these
initiatives is much more than the mere search for alternative measures.
These initiatives are based on the political conviction that policies of
the 21st century should be based on a new idea of progress, well-being
and, thus, of development—and should no longer cling exclusively to
the idea of growth and thus of economic development. However, as
with the notion of development, there is to date no clear theory as to
what this new definition or, better, theory of modern progress should
look like. Criticism of economic development and growth is not new—
and has been around for at least forty years (the famous Club of Rome
report “The Limits of Growth” from 1972 is a standard reference).
Yet the last few years have seen, for the first time since the ascendance
of gdp, an open commitment of politicians to seek alternatives.
A decisive event in this respect was the oecd World Forum
“Statistics, Knowledge and Policy” that was held in Istanbul in
2007. Representatives of the UN, the World Bank, the oecd and
other organizations and governments ratified the so-called “Istanbul
Declaration” which spoke of an “emerging consensus on the need to
undertake the measurement of societal progress in every country,
going beyond conventional economic measures such as gdp per
capita” [oecd, 2008: 15].22
This consensus was based on the following factors. One is the belief
that a global development model based on endless economic growth is
no longer environmentally and economically sustainable and must be
replaced in light of climate change and other challenges of modern
times. The other is that gdp no longer measures nor indicates what
22 This consensus on and belief in the use
of indicators was triggered by the apparent
success of the Millennium Development
Goals (mdg) as an indicator-supported policy
instrument, as well as by the recent advance-
ments in the measurement of welfare and,
above all, subjective well-being (see oecd
2008).
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constitutes a good life for the citizens of a given country (i.e.
welfare)—as had been believed ever since gdp became the focus of
political attention. With the slogan “Measuring and Fostering the
Progress of Societies,” the declaration calls upon national govern-
ments to “encourage communities to consider for themselves what
‘progress’ means in the 21st century” and to translate this into
indicators that should inform and structure politics in order to go
“beyond gdp.” The search for a new definition of development is thus,
above all and in a first step, a search for new statistical indicators.
Here, as in the case of economic development, statistics come before
theory.
In various countries, initiatives with differing degrees of citizen
participation in defining progress have been launched. France’s
“Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and
Social Progress” [2009] did not include participatory elements, but
because of its thoroughness, its report is considered the most
important methodological point of reference when discussing what
type of indicators could be integrated into a set of alternative welfare
measures. “Measures of Australia’s Progress,” the Italian initiative
“Benessere equo e sostenibile,” Great Britain’s “National Debate on
Well-Being” or Germany’s “Gut Leben in Deutschland” are but a few
examples of what has been called “a new global movement” in the
search for identifying new political priorities as alternatives to growth
by setting up a system of welfare indicators [Kroll 2011; Garcıa Dıez
and Lepenies 2015].
It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will lead to
a paradigm shift that supersedes the traditional notion of economic
development. Given the still-prevalent focus on growth and gdp in
global politics—public claims and initiatives to look into alternatives
notwithstanding—the prospects for success seem doubtful. But it is
still noteworthy that the combination of political circumstance and
statistics (coming before theory) now parallels, for the first time in the
history of development alternatives, those conditions which histori-
cally enabled the triumph of the idea of economic development.
The process of fixing alternative welfare indicators is a case study
worthy of observation and analysis by scientists working on
development. It will be interesting to observe whether alternative
indicators (and which sort of indicators) can have a lasting influence
on politics and alter the focus on gdp growth and economic
development as the sine qua non of progress. Most interesting will be
the question whether, in time, a modern Arthur Lewis appears—a norm
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entrepreneur combining successful welfare indicators with a novel and
lasting model and theory of well-being, progress and development for
the 21st century. Only then will all the ingredients of the triumph of
economic development—modeling, statistics and circumstance—be
fully replicated.
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Resume
La notion de « developpement economique »
domine les politiques d’aide internationale.
Le Produit Interieur Brut (pib) d’une nation
determine si celle-ci est developpee ou non,
et la croissance du pib est devenue la mesure
standard de tout progres en termes de
developpement. Cet article etudie l’evolution
du concept de developpement economique,
tel qu’il a emerge a partir d’une combinaison
specifique de modelisation, de statistique et
de circonstances politiques. Dans cette his-
toire, Arthus Lewis a joue un ro^le decisif,
mais en s’appuyant sur les travaux anterieurs
de Colin Clark consacres a la statistique sur
le revenu national, le fondement indispens-
able pour le modele de developpement
economique propose par la suite par Lewis.
Ce modele a ete adopte par les decideurs
politiques en que^te de cadre theorique pour
eclairer et rendre operationnel le concept,
jusqu’alors vague, de developpement. De
facxon plus decisive encore, l’indicateur sta-
tistique sur lequel Lewis appuie sa theorie
etait d’ores et deja universellement accepte.
En d’autres termes : la statistique est venue
avant la theorie. Cela implique des enseigne-
ments importants pour les approches alter-
natives du developpement : cela explique non
seulement pourquoi l’idee de developpement
economique reste si solidement ancree mais
suggere certaines conditions necessaires pour
qu’une theorie alternative puisse s’etablir.
Mots-cles : Developpement economique ;
Statistiques ; Produit Interieur Brut ; Alter-
natives de developpement ; Modeles
economiques.
Zusammenfassung
Das Konzept der ”„wirtschaftlichen En-
twicklung„ dominiert die internationale Zu-
sammenarbeit. Das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen
(gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt bip)
zeigt, ob ein Land mehr oder weniger en-
twickelt ist. Der Standardindikator daf€ur,
dass Entwicklung stattfindet, ist das bip-
Wachstum. Dieser Artikel untersucht die
Entstehung des Konzepts der wirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung als das Ergebnis eines
besonderen Zusammenspiels von Modellier-
ung, Statistik und politischen Rahmenbedin-
gungen. In dieser Geschichte spielt Arthur
Lewis eine besondere Rolle – aber nur weil
er auf die ersten internationalen Einkom-
mensstatistiken Colin Clarks zur€uckgreifen
konnte, die eine grundlegende Basis f€ur
Lewis ber€uhmtes Modell der wirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung darstellten. Lewis Modell
der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung wurde von
Politikern dankbar aufgegriffen, da es end-
lich das lange sehr vage verstandene Konzept
der Entwicklung konkretisierte und opera-
tionalisierbar machte. Wichtiger jedoch war,
dass die Statistiken, auf die Lewis seine
Argumentation aufbaute, schon lange pol-
tisch etabliert und akzeptiert waren, bevor
sie theoretisch untermauert wurden. Mit
anderen Worten: Statistik kam in dieser
Geschichte vor der Theorie. Dies ist eine
wichtige Lektion f€ur den Versuch, Alterna-
tiven zur Idee der wirtschaftlichen En-
twicklung zu etablieren. Es kann gezeigt
werden, warum das Konzept der wirtschaft-
lichen Entwicklung so fest im Sattel sitzt und
welche Bedingungen und Schritte notwendig
w€aren, damit sich Alternativen durchsetzen.
Schl€usselw€orter : Wirtschaftliche En-
twicklung; Statistik; Bruttoinlandsprodukt;
Entwicklungs-alternativen; €Okonomische
Modelle.
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